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CLD-089        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-4076 
___________ 
 
GREGORY CHAPMAN,  
                                         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3-15-cv-02350) 
District Judge:  Honorable Edwin M. Kosik 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 5, 2017 
 
Before: FISHER, SHWARTZ and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 24, 2017) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
PER CURIAM 
 Gregory Chapman is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se.  In December 2015, 
                                                                
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Chapman filed a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the District Court challenging 
the timeliness of his parole revocation hearing and the Parole Board’s calculation of his 
sentence.1  The District Court determined that Chapman’s claims were meritless and 
denied the § 2241 petition by opinion and order entered July 13, 2016.   
 Approximately three months later, on October 18, 2016, Chapman sought leave to 
file a belated motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (“A motion to alter or amend a judgment must 
be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.”).  Chapman explained that 
he had been in the course of moving from FCI Allenwood to FCI Fort Dix when the 
District Court ruled on his petition in July 13, 2016, and did not receive a copy of the 
decision until August 2016.   
The District Court rejected Chapman’s untimely motion.  The court noted that 
even assuming that Chapman did not receive its decision until August 2016, he had not 
explained his failure to move for reconsideration over the course of the subsequent three 
months.  Chapman now appeals from the District Court’s order.   
                                                                
1 28 U.S.C. § 2241 “confers habeas jurisdiction to hear the petition of a federal prisoner 
who is challenging not the validity but the execution of his sentence.”  Coady v. Vaughn, 
251 F.3d 480, 485-86 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2  Because 
Chapman’s motion for reconsideration was untimely under Rule 59(e), it did not toll the 
running of the time to appeal from the District Court’s order denying the underlying  
§ 2241 petition.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv).  Therefore, this Court has 
jurisdiction to review only the District Court’s order denying the untimely motion for 
reconsideration.  We review the District Court’s order denying Chapman’s motion for 
reconsideration for an abuse of discretion.  See Max’s Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. 
v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999).   
We will summarily affirm the District Court’s order because this appeal 
presents no substantial question.  See Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  The record 
reflects that Chapman did not file his motion within the 28-day period provided by Rule 
59(e).  Therefore, the District Court acted within its discretion in denying Chapman’s 
motion as time-barred under Rule 59(e).  In fact, the District Court was not permitted to 
consider this untimely motion.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2).3  The motions for 
appointment of counsel and bail are denied. 
                                                                
2 Chapman does not need a certificate of appealability to proceed with this appeal.  See 
United States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc), abrogated on 
other grounds by Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641 (2012).   
 
3 To the extent that the District Court could have construed Chapman’s motion as arising 
under Rule 60(b) instead, we note that he did not allege any facts that would entitle him 
to relief under any potentially applicable subsection of that Rule.  See, e.g. Fed. R. Civ. P. 
60(b)(1) (mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect); 60(b)(2) (newly discovered 
evidence); 60(b)(3) (fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party); 
60(b)(6) (extraordinary and special circumstances).    
